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Abstract
This article argues in favour of lowering the voting age to
16. First, it outlines a respect-based account of democracy
where the right to vote is grounded in a respect for citizens’
autonomous capacities. It then outlines a normative account
of autonomy, modelled on Rawls’s two moral powers, say-
ing what criteria must be met for an individual to possess a
(pro tanto) moral right to vote. Second, it engages with
empirical psychology to show that by the age of 16 (if not
earlier) individuals have developed all of the cognitive com-
ponents of autonomy. Therefore, since 16- and 17-year-
olds (and quite probably those a little younger) possess the
natural features required for autonomy, then, to the extent
that respect for autonomy requires granting political rights
including the right to vote – and barring some special
circumstances that apply only to them – 16- and 17-year-
olds should be granted the right to vote.
Keywords: voting age, children’s rights, youth enfranchise-
ment, democracy, votes at 16
1 Introduction
Over the last decade, more and more countries have
allowed 16- and 17-year-olds to vote. Nicaragua and
Brazil were early adopters, allowing 16-year-olds to vote
in all elections from the 1980s. In the mid-2000s, 16-
year-olds were given the vote in the Isle of Man (2006),
Austria (2007), Guernsey (2007), Jersey (2008) and
Ecuador (2008). More recently, 16-year-olds have been
granted the vote in Argentina (2012) and Malta (2013),
and in Scotland (2014), where they can vote in local and
Scottish parliamentary elections, and voted in the 2014
independence referendum, although they cannot vote in
UK-wide elections. Other countries allow 16-year-olds
to vote in some elections but not others: 16-year-olds
can vote in state or municipal elections in some German
Länder and Swiss cantons; Estonia has allowed 16-year-
olds to vote in local elections since 2015; and 16-year-
olds could vote in the official Catalan self-determination
referendum of 2014. Most countries, however, are still
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reticent: Luxembourg rejected a reduction in the voting
age in a referendum in 2015, and the UK parliament
debated but rejected allowing 16-year-olds to vote in the
EU referendum.
So far, research into the voting age has seen the right to
vote as grounded in political knowledge and political
interest/apathy, with empirical research investigating
whether 16- and 17-year-olds have enough political
knowledge, or enough political interest, to vote.1 How-
ever, in this article, I will examine an alternative liberal
view: that the right to vote is grounded not in knowl-
edge but in moral autonomy and that all those who pos-
sess the capacities for autonomy have a pro tanto right
to vote.2 This article therefore sets out an account of
autonomy, and the criteria individuals need to meet to
count as possessing autonomy, and then uses empirical
psychology to see whether adolescents meet those crite-
ria. In fact, developmental psychologists are clear that
adolescents (from 14/15) are almost indistinguishable
from adults in their general cognitive abilities.3 There-
1. Tak Wing Chan and Matthew Clayton, “Should the Voting Age Be
Lowered to Sixteen? Normative and Empirical Considerations,” Political
Studies 54, no. 3 (2006), pp. 533-58; Tommy Peto, “Why the Voting
Age Should Be Lowered to 16,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 17,
no. 3 (2018), pp. 277-97; Eva Zeglovits and Julian Aichholzer, “Are
People More Inclined to Vote at 16 Than at 18? Evidence for the First-
Time Voting Boost among 16- to 25-Year-Olds in Austria,” Journal of
Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 24, no. 3 (2014), pp. 351-61; Eva
Zeglovits and Martina Zandonella, “Political Interest of Adolescents
Before and After Lowering the Voting Age: The Case of Austria,” Jour-
nal of Youth Studies 16, no. 6 (2013), pp. 1-21; Eva Zeglovits, “Voting
at 16? Youth Suffrage Is Up for Debate,” European View 12, no. 2
(2013), pp. 249-54; Johannes Bergh, “Does Voting Rights Affect the
Political Maturity of 16- and 17-Year-Olds? Findings from the 2011
Norwegian Voting-Age Trial,” Electoral Studies 32, no. 1 (2013), pp.
90-100; Markus Wagner, David Johann, and Sylvia Kritzinger, “Voting
at 16: Turnout and the Quality of Vote Choice,” Electoral Studies 31,
no. 2 (2012), pp. 372-83; Daniel Hart and Robert Atkins, “American
Sixteen-and Seventeen-Year-Olds Are Ready to Vote,” The ANNALS of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 633 no. 1
(2011).
2. ‘pro tanto’ because this right is perhaps sometimes legitimately suspen-
ded or infringed, e.g. in times of national emergency. I do not address
the question of when, if ever, such circumstances arise.
3. Joe Coleman, “Answering Susan: Liberalism, Civic Education, and the
Status of Younger Persons,” in The Moral and Political Status of Chil-
dren, ed. David Archard and Colin M. Macleod, 1 online resource
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. viii, 296 pages, 168. Also
David Moshman, Adolescent Psychological Development: Rationality,
Morality, and Identity (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1999), p. 40; Michael D. A. Freeman, The Moral Status of Children:
Essays on the Rights of the Child (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997),
p. 28; M. Schmidt and N. Reppucco, “Children’s Rights and Capaci-
ties,” in Children, Social Science, and the Law, ed. Bette L. Bottoms,
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fore, since 16- and 17-year-olds (and perhaps even
younger adolescents) possess the same cognitive capaci-
ties as adults, they meet the criteria for the possession of
autonomy. Thus, because autonomy grounds a (pro tan-
to) right to vote, 16- and 17-year-olds have a pro tanto
right to vote.4
One point worth clarifying is that this investigation into
the voting age is not an investigation into what Dahl
calls the ‘problem of the unit’ or the ‘boundary prob-
lem’.5 The problem of the unit is, what persons have a
rightful claim to be included in the demos? When we
say a group of individuals, or ‘the people’, have a right
to democratic self-rule, who is included in ‘the people’?
This is distinct from what I shall call the qualification
question: which members of that people/association/
unit should be permitted to vote? Whether the problem
of the unit is solved by the ‘all affected’ principle (every-
one affected by state actions should be included), the ‘all
subjected’ principle (everyone subject to the laws of the
state should be included), an appeal to historic bound-
aries, or an appeal to national identity and self-determi-
nation, there remains the question of who within that
unit is qualified to vote. Therefore, determining
whether an individual has the right to vote within a par-
ticular state/association is a two-step process: (i) are
they a member of the relevant group? (ii) are they the
kind of individual who in general merits the right to
vote? This article speaks only to the second question.
My argument is that 16-year-olds should, in general, be
allowed to vote. It is a separate question whether for,
say, Dutch elections, it is those 16-year-olds who are
affected/coerced by the policies of the Dutch govern-
ment, who are resident within the Netherlands or who
are Dutch nationals who should be allowed to vote.
I also want to make two methodological points. First, I
take as a general assumption that all adult citizens, or
the overwhelming majority of them, possess the natural
features required for the right to vote. Therefore, to
establish whether adolescents possess the right to vote,
we can compare their psychological capacities to adults’.
When defining the criteria for autonomy, there is the
threshold question: what level of psychological capacity
is required to meet those normative criteria? Sorites’
paradoxes abound. But if adolescents reach the same
level of autonomy as average adults, then, assuming
adults deserve the right to vote, so too do adolescents. In
fact, the threshold will be below the level of an average
adult. After all, adults with capacities significantly
below average still possess the vote. Of course, by
assuming that adults generally deserve the vote, this art-
icle will not convince an anti-democrat that 16- and 17-
Margaret Bull Kovera, and Bradley D. McAuliff (Cambridge, UK; New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 160.
4. For simplicity, I will usually refer to ‘the right vote’ without adding ‘pro
tanto’ each time.
5. Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1989), pp. 193, 119 and 146-47. See also Goodin’s ‘problem of
“constituting the demos”’, Robert E. Goodin, “Enfranchising All Affect-
ed Interests, and Its Alternatives,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 35, no. 1
(2007), pp. 40-68.
year-olds should be allowed to vote. But for democrats,
the argument cantilevers from the claim that adults
should have the vote to the claim that 16- and 17-year-
olds should have the vote.
Second, this article examines empirical psychology rath-
er than neuroscience to assess teenagers’ capacities.
Neuroscientific results are sometimes quoted in debates
about the voting age. For example, Chan and Clayton,
and Dawkins and Cornwell quote research showing that
adolescents’ frontal lobes have not yet settled into an
adult structure.6 More specifically, there is less develop-
ment in the connections in the fronto-parietal-striatal
brain system (localised primarily in the lateral prefrontal
cortex, inferior parietal lobe and anterior cingulate cor-
tex).7 Since the frontal lobes are associated with execu-
tive functions such as the cognitive and emotional con-
trol needed to make cool and rational decisions, they
claim this shows that teenagers do not merit the right to
vote.8 That said, others dispute whether these neurolog-
ical differences are a significant factor in political deci-
sion-making.9 However, this article engages with the
psychological evidence rather than the neurological
evidence. The reason is that since we define autonomy
in terms of powers of reason, we should investigate
directly whether adolescents possess those powers of
reason (and the cognitive control to exercise them). If
adolescents lack key reasoning abilities, they lack the
relevant autonomy to vote, even if they have ‘fully
developed’ brains. And if they possess these powers of
reason, then they do possess the relevant autonomy,
even if they have otherwise ‘undeveloped brains’. Neu-
rology may provide interesting insights into the bases of
cognition, but it is not itself of direct normative rele-
vance.10 For that reason, I focus on the psychology.
1.1 Outline
Section 2 lays out how autonomy is linked to the right to
vote, and the criteria for possessing autonomy. It uses
the Rawlsian account of the ‘two moral powers’ to pro-
vide the criteria for possessing the relevant kind of
autonomy. Section 3 lays out which parts of empirical
psychology are relevant to the two moral powers. Sec-
tions 4-8 provide an empirical outline of adolescent psy-
chological capabilities through the normative lens of the
two moral powers. In turn, they examine five norma-
6. Chan and Clayton, “Should the Voting Age Be Lowered to Sixteen?
Normative and Empirical Considerations,” p. 357; Richard Dawkins and
R. Elizabeth Cornwell, “Dodgy Frontal Lobes, Y’dig? The Brain Isn’t
Ready to Vote at 16,” The Guardian, 13th December 2003.
7. Laurence Steinberg, “Adolescent Brain Science and Juvenile Justice Poli-
cymaking,” Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 23, no. 4 (2017),
p. 414.
8. For results on neurological development, see J. N. Giedd et al., “Brain
Development During Childhood and Adolescence: A Longitudinal Mri
Study,” Nature Neuroscience 2, no. 10 (Oct 1999), pp. 861-63; V. F.
Reyna and F. Farley, “Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision Mak-
ing: Implications for Theory, Practice, and Public Policy,” Psychology
Science in the Public Interest 7, no. 1 (2006), pp. 1-44.
9. Hart and Atkins, “American Sixteen-and Seventeen-Year-Olds Are
Ready to Vote,” p. 220.
10. See also Steinberg, “Adolescent Brain Science and Juvenile Justice Poli-
cymaking,” p. 418.
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tively relevant components of cognitive thinking: logical
reasoning, empirical reasoning, decision-making, argu-
mentation, and moral reasoning. Each section (i) defines
them theoretically and identifies their sub-components;
(ii) discusses their normative relevance; and (iii) pro-
vides an empirical comparison of adolescents and adults.
Together, these sections show that older adolescents
(14-16) and adults possess the two moral powers equal-
ly. Section 9 then examines ‘hierarchical control’ and
assesses the claim that although adolescents have the
same cognitive abilities as adults, they are more impul-
sive or emotional and so should not be granted the vote.
While Section 9 accepts the empirical claim, it denies
that this should be a bar to adolescent voting, since
voting does not usually occur in the type of emotionally
intense setting that some adolescents struggle with.
Therefore, to the extent that respect for the two moral
powers implies a right to vote for adults, so too should it
for adolescents. First, let us examine autonomy and how
it links to voting rights.
2 Autonomy and the Right to
Vote
This section outlines the view that the right to vote is
grounded in a respect for individual autonomy and, in
so doing, provides an account of the criteria that, on one
major liberal tradition, an individual must meet to pos-
sess autonomy and therefore to deserve the right to vote.
First, I outline the autonomy-respecting view of democ-
racy. Then I outline the Rawlsian account of autonomy,
which is grounded in the ‘two moral powers’, and I link
it to the right to vote. The two moral powers then pro-
vide us with the qualification criteria for inclusion in
political decision-making. This section is, of course, not
a fully fleshed out liberal defence of democracy: that
would require (much) more space than can be given
here. But it does provide an outline of how this account
of democracy works and the qualification criteria for the
franchise under this account.
A certain classic view of democracy takes democracy to
be implied by basic values of respect or fairness.11 This
account says that all competent individuals possess the
right to direct their own lives autonomously. This
implies that they deserve a say in those decisions that
regulate their lives and/or deserve to have decisions
made about them justified to them in some way. Princi-
ples of fairness then imply that one individual’s voice
should have the same weighting as anyone else’s. There-
fore, denying a competent citizen the right to vote does
two wrongs: (i) it violates their equal standing as a
citizen; (ii) it fails to respect that citizen as an autono-
mous decision maker. These two effects can be wrong
11. Francis Schrag, “Children and Democracy: Theory and Policy,” Politics,
Philosophy & Economics 3, no. 3 (2004), pp. 365-79, 366; Ronald
Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2011),
p. 379.
either derivatively for recognition-type reasons or
intrinsically as a violation of basic principles. Either
way, mature/competent citizens deserve consultation
and equal standing, and it is wrong to deny them those
things. This is true regardless of whether those individ-
uals also happen to share an independent characteristic
(like age) with other people who perhaps do not deserve
equal standing. Thus, there is a rights violation, a pro
tanto wrong, when we deny the vote to competent
people, and a fortiori there is a pro tanto wrong when we
deny the right to vote to competent 16- to17-year-olds.
So, what are the capacities required to possess autono-
my? One prominent liberal account of autonomy, which
shares features with many other liberal accounts, is the
Rawlsian one.12 The Rawlsian account of autonomy is
based on the two moral powers:
i. A capacity for a sense of justice: ‘the capacity to
understand, to apply, and to act from (and not
merely in accordance with) the principles of politi-
cal justice’;
ii. A capacity for a conception of the good: ‘the capacity
to have, to revise, and rationally to pursue a concep-
tion of the good’.13
Let’s first examine the second moral power. All major
accounts of autonomy encompass something like this: a
self-imposed authentic standard of excellence (J.S.
Mill), a conception of what gives value to life (R. Dwor-
kin), projects and goals (Raz). Griffin characterises a
‘human existence’ as involving reflection and assess-
ment. We ‘form pictures of what a good life would be
[and] … we try to realise these pictures’.14 He concludes
that, ‘what … [gives] dignity to human life is our
capacity to choose and to pursue our conception of a
worthwhile life’.15 The basic idea is that, to be autono-
mous, you must be, amongst other things, self-deter-
mining your life. And to do this, you must be determin-
ing your life according to some self-imposed standard or
set of goals. Put differently, you must be part-author of
your life. And to be part-author of your own life, you
must have a (partial) script. The ‘conception of the
good’ is that script (even if that script is constantly
revised, edited and rewritten). We can use Rawls’s con-
ception of this idea, embodied in the ‘second moral
power’, because it usefully splits the power into differ-
ent component abilities: ‘the capacity to have, to revise,
and rationally to pursue a conception of the good’,
which we can then use to match against specific psy-
12. Strictly speaking, in the Rawlsian framework, the two moral powers are
the basis of moral personhood/citizenship rather than components of
‘autonomy’, but it can play a similar role to autonomy in our overall
argument. See Catherine Audard, “Autonomy, Moral,” in The Cam-
bridge Rawls Lexicon, ed. Jon Mandle and David A. Reidy (Cambridge;
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015a), pp. xxiii, 897 pages and
“Autonomy, Political,” in The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon, ed. Jon Man-
dle and David A. Reidy (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2015b), pp. xxiii, 897 pages.
13. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, MA; Lon-
don: Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 18-19.
14. James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2010), p. 32.
15. Ibid., p. 44.
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chology capabilities later. Similarly, Rawls gives a pre-
cise definition of ‘conception of the good’, saying it is:
an ordered family of final ends and aims which speci-
fies a person’s conception of what is of value in
human life or, alternatively, of what is regarded as a
fully worthwhile life.16
Therefore, the Rawlsian second moral power embodies
the same idea as the other major liberal accounts of
autonomy mentioned earlier while providing a precision
that is helpful when we turn to empirical psychology.
This is why we should use it when investigating adoles-
cent autonomy.
It is worth clarifying a few things about the second
moral power. This ‘plan of life’ or ‘conception of the
good’ does not need to be good in an objective sense.
Indeed, some people’s lifestyle and life goals may seem
objectively objectionable. But the whole point of self-
authorship is that we can decide and construct for our-
selves what is good for us. Any dream will do (although
we may restrict how you pursue that dream).17 This
may sound rather grand, but it need not be. R. Dworkin
provides the following image:
Each person follows a more or less articulate concep-
tion of what gives value to life. The scholar who val-
ues a life of contemplation has such a conception; so
does the television-watching, beer-drinking citizen
who is fond of saying “This is the life”, though of
course he has thought less about the issue and is less
able to describe or defend his conception.18
One’s life need not have a unity, or a single rigid plan
(though it may do). The ideal of autonomy is about
being able to fashion one’s life through one’s own goals
and decisions, even as those goals shift and change.19 To
the extent you have formed goals and plans, or assessed
what you want to do in a given situation, you have been
(to various degrees of sophistication and explicitness)
reasoning about ‘the good’. Like Monsieur Jourdian in
Molière’s The Bourgeois Gentleman, who discovers that
‘these forty years now I’ve been speaking in prose with-
out knowing it!’, we are using fancy concepts used to
describe something which, at its heart, is familiar.
How does the second moral power link to the right to
vote? Respect for autonomy, and for the second moral
power specifically, means letting people make decisions
about themselves. It would be inconsistent with respect
for autonomy to substitute your own judgment for
someone else’s about their own good: claims that ‘I
16. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, pp. 18-19; also Pete Murray,
“Conception of the Good,” in The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon, ed. Jon
Mandle and David A. Reidy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2015).
17. You may not, for example, sell your brother into slavery to pursue your
dream.
18. Ronald Dworkin, “Liberalism,” in A Matter of Principle (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1986), p. 191.
19. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986),
pp. 370-71.
respect you as a chooser but will deny you any choice’
would be disingenuous. In particular here, the second
moral power involves the ability to make judgments
about one’s own interests. Respect for autonomy
requires a respect for how individuals identify and pur-
sue their own interests. If your mother were devoted to
your interests, but nevertheless ignored how you per-
ceive those interests, she would be lacking in respect for
you or, more specifically, for your autonomous ability to
define and identify your own interests. This would be
true even if your judgment turned out to be mistaken
and hers correct. To respect someone as a person is to
take their own view of themselves seriously. As Benn
puts it, you would have:
every reason to resent the indulgent dismissal of
[your] point of view, “Yes, dear, but Mummy knows
best,” even in the case that Mummy does.20
This means that when certain decisions are made about
an individual or for an individual, that decision-making
process should include their own judgment about them-
selves. For most self-regarding decisions, this implies
the liberal position that people may make such decisions
uninhibited. But when decisions must be made about
people collectively through political institutions,
including individuals’ own judgments about themselves
means giving them a voice in that process, something
usually formalised and enshrined in the right to vote.21
The people must be allowed to define and express their
own interests, and not have their interests determined
for them by technocrats or despots.
Next, let’s examine the first moral power, which covers
the ability to reason about justice, apply principles of
justice and, as I would add to it, reason about and apply
moral principles more generally. Including the first
moral power helps us make sense of the idea of moral
autonomy. Self-government encompasses the ability to
decide not only how you would like to live your life, but
also how you ought to live your life. The capacity to rea-
son about justice and morality captures the idea that to
be truly morally self-governing we must be able to
impose moral laws on ourselves. This ideal is Kantian in
flavour: for a rational (and autonomous) being to qualify
as such, it must be able to construct, recognise and fol-
low moral laws.
How does the first moral power link to the right to vote?
The first moral power helps make sense of ‘political
autonomy’. This is the idea that humans are fundamen-
tally politically free. The ideal of political autonomy is
what makes liberals concerned about state legitimacy
and state coercion. Political autonomy is the idea that
20. Stanley I. Benn, A Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge Universi-
ty Press, 1988), p. 105.
21. Perhaps there are ways other than the vote that protects people’s moral
right to self-government and includes them in political decision-making.
It may not be an analytic truth that the moral right to inclusion in politi-
cal decision-making entails the right to vote, but the right to vote does
seem to be the best method we have come up with for instantiating
that moral right. Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, pp. 379-400.
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we, as individuals, are politically self-governing. Indi-
viduals can deliberate on, construct and self-impose
rules of political morality. Respecting that ability to
politically self-govern means recognising individuals’
political freedom. This gives rise to a problem: if indi-
viduals are fundamentally politically self-governing,
then why may a coercive institution, such as the state,
govern them politically? One way to (at least partially)
address this problem is to include those individuals in
the political decision-making mechanisms of the state.22
This is a different argument from the one earlier about
letting people define their own interests and including
them in decisions that affect their interests. Political
rights, such as the right to vote, presuppose an ability to
reason not merely about what we want individually, but
about the right and the good more generally. Mirroring
the above argument about the second moral power,
technocrats and rulers may not impose their own
version of the right and the good on people who possess
the capacity to make their own judgments about the
right and the good. Therefore, in political decisions,
which involve imposing views of justice and morality on
a society, respect for autonomy means including all
members of that society who can make decisions about
justice and morality. To exclude those with that capaci-
ty is to disrespect that capacity.
Therefore, autonomy, as exemplified here by the two
moral powers, grounds the right to vote in two ways:
first, individuals who can define and pursue their own
interests must be included in decisions about their
choices and their interests; and, second, individuals who
can reason about justice must be included in decisions
about the rules of justice that apply to them. Individuals
who possess the two moral powers therefore possess
these moral rights to inclusion in political decision-mak-
ing. So, to assess whether 16- and 17-year-olds should
possess the right to vote, we should assess empirically
whether they possess the two moral powers.
2.1 Autonomy and Political Maturity
How does the autonomy approach here relate to the
political maturity approach (emphasising knowledge and
interest in politics) more common in the political sci-
ence literature? The autonomy approach fits broadly
within a Kantian or Republican tradition, in which
political rights come from citizens’ dignity, personhood
or autonomy. Non-democratic forms of government are
objectionable because they stand the state in the wrong
kind of relationship to its citizens.
The political maturity approach appears to have roots in
epistocracy, that is, a tradition which holds that political
power should be wielded by those best able to make
political decisions. The concern in this tradition is often
good outcomes. Of course, many in the epistocratic tra-
dition are not democrats: Plato, for example, argued that
political power should be restricted to an elite class of
the wise and just. However, there are democratic argu-
ments grounded in the wisdom of the crowd, rather
22. Ibid., p. 385.
than the wisdom of the elite. Aristotle, retaining Plato’s
concern for just and wise government, argued that larg-
er groups are more likely to make correct decisions than
smaller groups, even if additional members are less wise
than the existing members, so long as the new voters are
wise enough.23 Condorcet’s jury theorem similarly dem-
onstrates that adding more members to a group increa-
ses the chances that a collective decision is correct, so
long as each additional voter is more than 50% likely to
make the correct decision. This theorem, as with the
Aristotelian argument, is sometimes used to justify
democracy, but it would only suggest extending the
franchise when the additional voters are sufficiently
competent. The most significant democratic theorist in
the epistocratic tradition is J.S. Mill. Concerned about
granting votes to an uneducated mob, he argued that the
educated should be given extra votes and advocated
knowledge requirements for the franchise (albeit with a
low bar):
I regard it as wholly inadmissible that any person
should participate in the suffrage without being able
to read, write, and, I will add, perform the common
operations of arithmetic.24
The concern about whether people can make sufficient-
ly competent political decisions seems to animate those
who use knowledge and interest in politics to either
exclude or include adolescents from voting. Chan and
Clayton, for example, argue that, ‘we have good reasons
of justice to prevent the incompetent from voting’,25 and
that if the voting age were lowered:
too many of them [16- and 17-year-olds] would vote
and do so incompetently, in a way that would be det-
rimental to our democracy.26
The political maturity approach can therefore, broadly,
be seen as part of the same epistocratic tradition as J.S.
Mill: concerned about good governance and restricting
the vote from those who may damage the overall deci-
sion-making quality of the polis.
How do the autonomy and political maturity approaches
differ? First, the political maturity approach takes
interest in politics to be of fundamental importance,
whereas the autonomy approach takes it to be morally
irrelevant (although an interest in politics could be one
of many ways that individuals exercise and develop their
moral reasoning abilities). While Chan and Clayton,
among others, claim political apathy disqualifies teen-
agers from the franchise, the autonomy approach asks
instead whether they have the relevant psychological
23. David M. Estlund, “Why Not Epistocracy?”, in Desire, Identity, and
Existence: Essays in Honor of T.M. Penner, ed. Naomi Reshotko and
Terry Penner (Kelowna, BC: Academic Print. & Pub., 2003), pp. 55-57.
24. John Stuart Mill, “Considerations on Representative Government,” in
Essays on Politics and Society, ed. John M. Robson, Collected Works of
John Stuart Mill (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 470.
25. Chan and Clayton, “Should the Voting Age Be Lowered to Sixteen?
Normative and Empirical Considerations,” p. 539.
26. Ibid., p. 537.
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capacities. Rights are not generally denied to those
uninterested in using them. To deny someone the vote
just because they are not interested in politics is to dis-
respect their autonomy, because you are unilaterally
substituting their judgment with yours about what is
good for them and right for the community. Of course,
people who are uninterested in politics may let others
make those judgments for them by not voting. But
choosing to do so is an instantiation of their autonomy
rather than an infringement of it. The autonomy
approach would grant the apathetic this choice because
to do so is to respect them as choosers.
The second difference between the political maturity
and autonomy approaches is in their attitude towards
knowledge. Those in the epistocratic tradition see
knowledge, or education, as key qualifications for the
franchise because it helps voters to collectively make
better decisions. The autonomy approach is concerned
about the state standing in the right kind of relation to
those whom it governs, and holds that, generally speak-
ing, it may not rule over autonomous citizens who have
no say in it, even those citizens who are uneducated.27
However, both accounts do care about competence/
development to some extent. In neither account do
rocks, plants or animals qualify for the franchise. So
there must be some natural features possessed by (adult)
humans that qualify them for the vote. Therefore, both
care about children reaching some threshold to qualify
for the vote. But the approaches have different attitudes
to the threshold. On the autonomy account, reaching
the threshold means reaching a political status that is
morally incompatible with non-democratic rule. On the
epistocratic account, reaching the threshold means
reaching a level of competence/ability such that the
individual can usefully contribute to democratic and
political decision-making.
Therefore, the political maturity approach broadly lies
within an epistocratic tradition that cares about demo-
cratic decisions having good outcomes or good delibera-
tive processes, and sees knowledge and interest as of
fundamental importance. The autonomy approach,
however, sees interest as lacking fundamental impor-
tance in the franchise and is generally hostile to knowl-
edge requirements that may lead to the domination or
disrespect of citizens.
Since we are adopting the autonomy approach here, let’s
now examine which psychological capacities correspond
to the two moral powers which constitute autonomy and
therefore which capacities we must measure to investi-
gate whether 16- and 17-year-olds should possess the
vote.
27. For one such opposition to knowledge requirements, see David M.
Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 206-22.
3 Connecting Psychology to
the Two Moral Powers
In this section, I outline what psychological capacities
are presupposed by the two moral powers. These boil
down to five: logical/syllogistic reasoning, empirical
reasoning, decision-making, argumentation and moral
reasoning. In the following sections, we will see that
each component is possessed equally by adolescents and
adults, and therefore that adolescents (or, at least, older
adolescents) fully possess the two moral powers. Let’s
take each moral power in turn.
The second moral power is the capacity to have, to
revise and rationally to pursue a conception of the good,
which specifies an ordered family of final ends and aims.
The full ability to have a conception of the good
requires moral reasoning abilities, since you must inter-
nalise and understand moral norms. Once you have
internalised normative beliefs, you can be said to ‘have’
a theory of the good.
The capacity to revise a conception of the good requires
a combination of logical/syllogistic reasoning, moral
reasoning and argumentative ability. To revise a con-
ception of the good, you must understand the rules of
logic to make rational and reasonable inferences; you
must be able to reason in moral terms to assess the con-
tents of your conception of the good; finally, you must
possess abilities of argumentation to generate and cri-
tique arguments and counterarguments so you can
judge whether to revise your views about the good.
Without such psychological capacities, one would be
unable to possess the second moral power. Since, as dis-
cussed later, adolescents have all those abilities, they can
therefore revise their conception of the good.
The ability rationally to pursue that conception of the
good is provided by empirical reasoning, argumentation
and decision-making rationality. Empirical reasoning is
necessary to assess for yourself the best means to your
ends and argumentation, which includes the ability to
follow and critique arguments, is necessary to assess the
advice of others, e.g. doctors, lawyers, etc., who might
provide advice on how best to achieve your ends. Deci-
sion-making rationality is also necessary ‘rationally to
pursue’ your conception of the good, since individuals
need it to avoid decision-making fallacies that could
otherwise frustrate their actions. By having the same
abilities of empirical reasoning, argumentation and deci-
sion-making as adults, adolescents have an equal ability
rationally to pursue their conception of the good.
Finally, individuals need the capacity to specify ‘an
ordered family of final ends and aims’.28 The ability to
order, weigh up and trade-off different goals and values
requires the ability to make ‘preference judgments’ (a
component of decision-making rationality), which con-
sist in weighing up and trading-off different preferen-
ces. However, since it is not merely preferences that
28. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, p. 19.
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must be weighed in a conception of the good but also
normative values, weighing ends also requires moral
reasoning abilities. Complex moral reasoning, which
involves balancing personal goals, social norms and
moral values, is important so that individuals can coor-
dinate different normative values within their own
thinking. And as will be discussed later, adolescents and
adults have the same levels of moral reasoning and deci-
sion-making abilities.
The first moral power, as we are understanding it here,
is the capacity to understand, apply, and act from moral
principles and principles of justice. The ability to
understand those principles is given by a level of devel-
opment in prosocial moral reasoning at least beyond
hedonistic and direct-reciprocity reasoning; and, for
complex dilemmas, development in complex moral rea-
soning. In additional to moral reasoning, the first moral
power requires the other abilities necessary for ‘rational
pursuit’ described in the above discussion of the second
moral power (empirical reasoning, argumentation, deci-
sion-making).
The above outlines how the two moral powers corre-
spond to various aspects of cognitive psychology.
Therefore, in demonstrating that adolescents possess
equivalent levels of the five key psychological capacities,
we will have demonstrated that adolescents possess the
two moral powers and therefore (via the arguments of
Section 2) that they have a pro tanto right to vote. Let’s
now investigate each of those five psychological capaci-
ties in turn: logical/syllogistic reasoning, empirical rea-
soning, decision-making, argumentation and moral rea-
soning.
4 Logical Reasoning
4.1 Definition
Logical reasoning includes three core abilities: (1) to
understand the rules of logic and inference; (2) to
understand the concept of ‘validity’ as distinct from
‘truth’ and to follow deductive arguments and assess
their validity. And the ability not only to understand
and follow given logical inferences but (3) to draw infer-
ences oneself from given premises. This includes being
able to solve both determinate and indeterminate syllo-
gisms.29 Determinate syllogisms are syllogisms in which
the conclusion follows from the premises with logical
necessity. Indeterminate syllogisms, by contrast, involve
conclusions that are perhaps suggested by the premises,
but do not follow as a matter of necessity. Logical rea-
soning, therefore, covers the ability to understand and
apply the rules of logic.
4.2 Normative Significance
Logical reasoning abilities are at the heart of philosophi-
cal accounts of humans as rational beings. Logical rea-
29. Paul A. Klaczynski, Mary J. Schuneman, and David B. Daniel, “Theories
of Conditional Reasoning: A Developmental Examination of Competing
Hypotheses,” Developmental Psychology 40, no. 4 (2004), pp. 559-71.
soning is important for forming beliefs, making evalua-
tive judgments, means-ends reasoning, justifying one’s
beliefs, and forming and following arguments and coun-
terarguments. Indeed, logical reasoning is a prerequisite
for all the accounts of autonomy mentioned earlier. The
second moral power requires that people be able to have
a ‘rational plan of life’. But someone unable to reason
logically cannot have a ‘rational’ plan of life properly
speaking, since their plans do not flow from the exercise
of reason.30 Similarly, they cannot reason morally (a
requirement of the first moral power), form logically
consistent preferences (a requirement of the second
moral power), or form practical syllogisms to make
rational decisions or assess evidence (required by both
moral powers). Logical/syllogistic reasoning is therefore
a major component of the two moral powers and is a
prerequisite for all other components of rationality.
Second, logical reasoning abilities protect individuals
(morally) from certain kinds of paternalism. Respect for
an individual’s ability to reason means not interfering
with the decisions the individual makes on the basis of
that ability. Interference would be illegitimate. How-
ever, if they lack that ability, then we no longer have the
same reason to respect their right to self-government
and so no longer have the same reason to include them
formally in decision-making processes that govern them.
Yet if an individual possesses this ability for self-gov-
ernment (i.e. possesses the two moral powers), then
respect means, generally speaking, allowing individuals
to make decisions about themselves; and when society as
a whole governs over the individual, they are bound to
include that individual in the decision-making process.
Therefore, logical reasoning helps to ground rights to
inclusion in the political process.
4.3 Empirical Findings
Let’s take each of the three components of logical rea-
soning in turn. First, in understanding validity as dis-
tinct from truth, adolescents and adults make similar
errors in deductive reasoning when the premises are
counterfactual.31 Moshman and Franks (1986) investi-
gated whether participants in their study could recog-
nise validity as distinct from truth. In the initial experi-
ments, 45% of 12- to 13-year-olds and 85% of college
students used validity as a basis for distinguishing dif-
ferent arguments. In later experiments, the experiment-
ers explained the concept of validity to the participants.
12- to 13-year-olds could then understand and apply the
concept of validity just as well as college students;
indeed, their results were almost indistinguishable.32
30. Though they may, by chance, have the appearance of rationality.
31. Henry Markovits and Robert Vachon, “Reasoning with Contrary-to-
Fact Propositions,” Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 47, no. 3
(1989), pp. 398-412; Deanna Kuhn and Robert S. Siegler, Handbook of
Child Psychology. Volume 2, Cognition, Perception, and Language, 6th
ed. (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2006), p. 962.
32. David Moshman and Bridget A. Franks, “Development of the Concept
of Inferential Validity,” Child Development 57, no. 1 (1986), pp.
153-65; Moshman, Adolescent Psychological Development: Rationali-
ty, Morality, and Identity, p. 15.
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Second, we can examine the ability to solve determinate
and indeterminate syllogisms. When solving problems
involving the most common determinate syllogisms (e.g.
modus ponens, modus tollens), performance is very good
by middle to late childhood at 75% accuracy, and is near
ceiling level by adolescence.33 For the most difficult
determinate syllogisms, there is ‘no clear developmental
change’ from the age of 8 onwards, with performance
‘remaining poor through adulthood’.34 Therefore, there
is no difference in the inferential abilities of adults and
adolescents in solving determinate syllogisms.
In studies investigating the ability to solve indetermi-
nate syllogisms, individuals are provided with premises
that involve denying the antecedent or affirming the
consequent. They are then asked whether they can infer
a definite conclusion.35 An argument that affirms the
consequent provides the premises:
if p then q
q
This argument ‘invites’ us (invalidly) to infer p as a con-
clusion. An argument that denies the antecedent provides
the premises:
if p then q
not p
This argument ‘invites’ us to conclude (invalidly) that
‘not q’. The correct answer is that we cannot infer a def-
inite conclusion from either syllogism.36 In general, mis-
takes in solving indeterminate syllogisms decrease with
age. In their landmark study, Klaczynski et al. (2004)
found correct indeterminate inferences were apparent
only in the adolescent (12-14) and adult groups, with a
small ability gap between those groups.37
To summarise, young adolescents (12-14) are equivalent
to adults in their understandings of validity and their
ability to solve determinate syllogisms, but are slightly
behind adults in their ability to solve indeterminate syl-
logisms. Older adolescents (15-16), however, have the
same or similar logical abilities as adults.38
33. Kuhn and Siegler, Handbook of Child Psychology. Volume 2, Cogni-
tion, Perception, and Language, p. 961. Also Klaczynski, Schuneman,
and Daniel, “Theories of Conditional Reasoning: A Developmental
Examination of Competing Hypotheses.”
34. Kuhn and Siegler, Handbook of Child Psychology. Volume 2, Cogni-
tion, Perception, and Language, p. 961; Klaczynski, Schuneman, and
Daniel, “Theories of Conditional Reasoning: A Developmental Examina-
tion of Competing Hypotheses.”
35. Robert B. Ricco, “The Development of Reasoning,” in Handbook of
Child Psychology and Developmental Science. Volume 2, Cognitive
Processes, ed. Lynn S. Liben, et al. (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2015),
pp. 525-26.
36. Ibid., pp. 525-27.
37. Klaczynski, Schuneman, and Daniel, “Theories of Conditional Reason-
ing: A Developmental Examination of Competing Hypotheses,” pp. 566
and 533.
38. Moshman, Adolescent Psychological Development: Rationality, Mor-
ality, and Identity, p. 40.
5 Empirical Reasoning
5.1 Definition
Under ‘empirical reasoning’ I class together the techni-
cally separate cognitive abilities of inductive/causal rea-
soning and scientific reasoning/hypothesis testing.
Inductive/causal reasoning consists of three key compo-
nents. (1) The ability to identify (potential) causes in
multivariable contexts and understand the importance
of isolating variables when making causal inferences. (2)
The ability to coordinate prior expectations with new
information. People who lack sufficient control over the
interaction of theory and evidence in their thinking
might ignore new evidence and base inferences on their
prior theory; distort evidence; or selectively recognise
only the data that fits their theory.39 Finally, inductive/
causal reasoning includes (3) the ability to make justified
inductive inferences.
Scientific thinking is the ability to form basic experi-
ments to test one’s hypotheses.40 It involves the ability
to solve problems across four phases: (i) the inquiry
phase, where ‘the goals of the activity are formulated’
and ‘the questions to be asked are identified’.41 The var-
ious possible investigative strategies formed in the
inquiry phase include, in increasing order of sophistica-
tion: just generate experimental outcomes; see what
makes a difference in outcomes; investigate the effect of
specific variables on outcomes. (ii) Analysis: one identi-
fies relevant evidence and analyses it.42 (iii) Inference
strategies involve applying mental operations to the
evidence to derive conclusions from that evidence.43
Inferential strategies range in adequacy from making
unsupported claims without processing the evidence to
skilled coordination of theory and evidence.44 (iv) Argu-
ment, which I discuss in Section 7, involves the ability to
construct arguments and deal with counterarguments.
With argumentation abilities, one can explain and justi-
fy the claims produced by the earlier phases of scientific
thinking. Hypothesis testing/scientific thinking, in
sum, refers to the ability to form relevant, testable
hypotheses; understand logically how to test those
hypotheses; run valid tests to get relevant data; and
draw valid inferences from that data.
39. Kuhn and Siegler, Handbook of Child Psychology. Volume 2, Cogni-
tion, Perception, and Language, p. 965; Deanna Kuhn, “Children and
Adults as Intuitive Scientists,” Psychological Review 96, no. 4 (Oct
1989), pp. 674-89; Ricco, “The Development of Reasoning,” p. 556.
40. Deanna Kuhn, “What Is Scientific Thinking and How Does It Devel-
op?,” in The Wiley-Blackwell Handbook of Childhood Cognitive
Development, ed. Usha Goswami, 2nd ed. (Chichester: John Wiley,
2010); Bärbel Inhelder and Jean Piaget, The Growth of Logical Thinking
from Childhood to Adolescence: An Essay on the Construction of For-
mal Operational Structures, trans. Anne Parsons and Stanley Milgram
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958).
41. Kuhn, “What Is Scientific Thinking and How Does It Develop?,” p. 505.
42. Ibid., p. 506.
43. Ibid; Kuhn and Siegler, Handbook of Child Psychology. Volume 2, Cog-
nition, Perception, and Language, p. 973.
44. Kuhn, “What Is Scientific Thinking and How Does It Develop?,” p. 507.
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5.2 Normative Significance
Normatively, empirical reasoning is important for rights
that presuppose an ability to make judgments about the
world. Most significantly, it enables individuals to apply
means-ends reasoning.
Theoretically, empirical reasoning forms part of both
moral powers. For the second moral power – the capaci-
ty to have, to revise, and rationally to pursue a concep-
tion of the good – it provides the ability ‘rationally to
pursue’ that conception of the good. This is because
‘rational pursuit’ involves taking the best means to your
ends, and means-ends reasoning requires empirical
judgments. For example, if your stated goal is improved
fitness, you need to work out empirically whether sitting
on a sofa, eating cake or jogging will achieve that goal.
Therefore, empirical reasoning is necessary for the two
moral powers. Empirical reasoning has a second impor-
tance: it facilitates the formation of a conception of the
good, understood as a family of ordered final ends,
because it helps the individual to learn what ends are
technically compatible and incompatible. For example,
we might reason, empirically, whether it is possible to
(a) enjoy rich foods, (b) stay slim and (c) avoid exercise.
If we (alas) reason that these are incompatible, we are
forced to rank and order these goals. For the first moral
power, empirical reasoning is required for the means-
ends reasoning needed to ‘apply’ principles of justice
and, just as it facilitates trading-off personal preferences
and goals, it facilitates trading-off and weighing moral
values. Empirical reasoning, therefore, is a key compo-
nent of each moral power.
Practically, means-ends reasoning is a prerequisite for
the franchise on most accounts of voting, since most
accounts require voters to understand/critique/propose
practical policies. Means-ends reasoning may be unnec-
essary for the franchise under some theories: certain
economistic theories of voting, for example, only ask
voters to reveal their ultimate preferences when
voting;45 other theories ask voters to reason exclusively
on the moral plane, leaving means-ends judgments to
technocrats.46 Autonomy-based accounts, however, may
rule out such technocratic forms of government as dis-
respecting voters’ capacity to reason empirically. What-
ever may be required in the ideal democratic system, in
the real world politics demands that voters assess practi-
cal policies and their likely effects. Since we must assess
policies when voting, and since assessing policies
requires reasoning empirically about their effects,
empirical reasoning is necessary for voting.
45. E.g. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (Lan-
ham, MD: Start Publishing, 2012); Kenneth Joseph Arrow, Social
Choice and Individual Values, 3rd ed. (New Haven, CT; London: Yale
University Press, 2012).
46. Max Weber, “Bureaucracy,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,
ed. Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Oxford; New York: Routledge,
2009a); “Politics as a Vocation,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociol-
ogy, ed. Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Oxford; New York: Rout-
ledge, 2009b).
5.3 Empirical Findings
Let’s first examine development in scientific reasoning
and then development in inductive reasoning.
As discussed previously, scientific reasoning breaks
down into four phases, each with its own modes of rea-
soning.
In the inquiry phase of investigation, preadolescent chil-
dren tend to apply less sophisticated strategies than
adults and adolescents. The most sophisticated investi-
gation strategy is the ‘falsification strategy’, in which
one formulates a hypothesis and attempts to disprove it.
But when comparing adolescents and adults, it seems
that they are both generally (in)capable of reasoning
effectively in the inquire phase of reasoning: most adults
and most adolescents fail to apply the falsification strat-
egy.47
With respect to analysis and inference, people in middle
childhood (8-11) sometimes appear quite ready to inter-
pret multiple variables as causing an outcome based on a
single co-occurrence of the variable and the outcome,
and empirical observations are used more to illustrate
theories than test them.48 Despite these weaknesses,
there is only modest improvement between middle
childhood (8-11) and early adulthood, with ‘far from
ideal’ performance by adults. Among 11- to 12-year-
olds, the proportion of beliefs in a test scenario based on
evidence-based inferences (rather than erroneous theo-
ry-based inferences) was about 25%, compared with
roughly 50% for non-college young adults. Following
an evidence-focus probe (where testers ask participants
questions like, ‘do these results tell you anything about
whether X has an effect?’) these percentages increased
to 60% and 80%, respectively.49 And when interpreting
some kinds of evidence, adults are just as likely to exhib-
it certain kinds of bias as 11- to 12-year-olds.50 Kuhn et
al. (1995) conclude that, for scientific reasoning, there is
only ‘some improvement in the years between middle
childhood and early adulthood’: individual variance is
high and age-related improvements are small.51 It
seems, therefore, that there is only a minimal difference
between younger adolescents (12-14) and adults in the
ability to reason scientifically.
Now turning to inductive/causal reasoning, we investi-
gate the three components separately. (i) Inductive infer-
ence: we have already shown that adolescents and adults
have roughly the same ability to make inductive inferen-
ces. (ii) Regarding the ability to identify and isolate vari-
ables in experiments, and understand why doing so is
47. Moshman, Adolescent Psychological Development: Rationality, Mor-
ality, and Identity, p. 17; Jonathan St B. T. Evans, Bias in Human Rea-
soning: Causes and Consequences (London: Erlbaum, 1989). Also
Deanna Kuhn et al., “Strategies of Knowledge Acquisition,” Mono-
graphs of the Society for Research in Child Development 60, no. 4
(1995), pp. 1-127.
48. Kuhn, “What Is Scientific Thinking and How Does It Develop?,” esp.
p. 508.
49. Kuhn and Siegler, Handbook of Child Psychology. Volume 2, Cogni-
tion, Perception, and Language, p. 966.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
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important, we have already shown that adolescents fully
possess this ability. For the avoidance of doubt:
adolescents have the ability to form hypotheses in
advance and to perform experiments that isolate vari-
ables.52
(iii) Coordinating theory and evidence: individuals are
considered incapable of adequate coordination if they
are more likely to interpret evidence as valid when it is
consistent with their previously held theories, and/or if
they interpret identical evidence differently as a func-
tion of its consistency with their prior theory. In fact,
people of all ages ignore and distort evidence that is dis-
crepant with their prior beliefs.53 And by adolescence,
the rates of bias are identical to those of adults.54
Indeed, as aggregate groups, adults have abilities equiv-
alent, not only to adolescents, but also to people towards
the end of middle childhood.55
To summarise, there is no significant difference
between adults and adolescents in their cognitive capa-
bilities for empirical reasoning. This means we must
respect adolescents’ empirical beliefs and cannot deny
them the vote on the grounds they reason differently
from older citizens or hold different empirical beliefs
than older citizens.
6 Decision-Making
6.1 Definition
Decision-making rationality has two main components:
the ability to make sound preference judgments and the
ability to make sound decision judgments. Preference
judgments involve the abilities to (i) render one’s prefer-
ences consistent;56 and (ii) select appropriate choice
strategies when applying preferences to concrete choices
(e.g. deciding how to weight different preferen-
ces).57Decision judgments are about making decisions in
accordance with sound decision-making principles and
52. Fred Danner, “Cognitive Development in Adolescence,” in The Adoles-
cent as Decision-Maker: Applications to Development and Education,
ed. Fred Danner and Judith Worell (San Diego; London: Academic
Press, 1989), pp. xii, 320 pages. Also Moshman, Adolescent Psycholog-
ical Development: Rationality, Morality, and Identity, fn 38.
53. Richard Lehrer and Leona Schauble, “The Development of Scientific
Thinking,” in Handbook of Child Psychology and Developmental Sci-
ence. Volume 2, Cognitive Processes, ed. Lynn S. Liben, et al. (Hobo-
ken, N.J.: John Wiley, 2015), p. 694.
54. Kuhn and Siegler, Handbook of Child Psychology. Volume 2, Cogni-
tion, Perception, and Language, p. 971. See also Ricco, “The Develop-
ment of Reasoning,” p. 536.
55. Kuhn and Siegler, Handbook of Child Psychology. Volume 2, Cogni-
tion, Perception, and Language, p. 966; Kuhn et al., “Strategies of
Knowledge Acquisition”; Lehrer and Schauble, “The Development of
Scientific Thinking,” p. 695.
56. See John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior (Princeton, NJ; Oxford: Princeton University Press,
2004).
57. Yoella Bereby-Meyer, Avi Assor, and Idit Katz, “Children’s Choice Strat-
egies: The Effects of Age and Task Demands,” Cognitive Development
19, no. 1 (2004), pp. 127-46.
avoiding decision fallacies, such as hindsight bias;58 con-
tingency bias;59 outcome bias;60 the gamblers’ fallacy;
and the sunk-cost fallacy.
6.2 Normative Significance
Theoretically, decision judgments and preference judg-
ments are each important for the two moral powers.
Preference judgments are important for possessing a
‘conception of the good’. A conception of the good
(required for the second moral power) specifies ‘an
ordered family of final ends and aims’. Since our prefer-
ences constitute some of our final ends and aims, and
since preference judgments are necessary to ‘order’
those final ends, the ability to make preference judg-
ments is necessary for the second moral power. How-
ever, the ability to make preference judgments is not
sufficient for the individual to be able to reason about
their preferences morally. Therefore, decision-making
rationality does not entail a full-blown ability to hold,
form and revise a conception of the good, although it is
necessary for those abilities.
Second, decision judgments are important for the ability
‘rationally to pursue’ a conception of the good. ‘Rational
pursuit’ of a goal involves both choosing the best means
to your ends and actually applying that reasoning in a
decision. After all, what is the use of means-ends rea-
soning if you cannot apply it to any concrete decision?
Decision-making fallacies confound this application and
lead us to make irrational and suboptimal decisions.
Decision-making rationality enables us ‘rationally to
pursue’ our conceptions of the good by helping us avoid
those decision-making fallacies. By the same reasoning,
decision-making rationality is necessary to apply moral
principles in our decisions and is therefore necessary for
the first moral power.
Practically, preference judgments are important for
voting: someone who cannot render their preferences
rational cannot have their preferences taken into
account. When someone completely lacks the ability to
render their preferences rational – even when their irra-
tionality is pointed out to them – there is not even a pri-
ma facie reason to take their declared preferences into
account. It is not clear what such a person is really
expressing when declaring inconsistent/irrational ‘pref-
erences’. It is unclear whether such a person really has
any preferences; and, even if they do, they seem unable
to express or represent those underlying preferences.
Decision-making rationality is therefore important for
any right, such as voting, which presupposes that some-
one knows, and can express, their preferences.
Therefore, decision-making ability is important for the
right to vote because (i) it is a prerequisite for rights that
require having and expressing at least minimally coher-
58. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “On the Reality of Cognitive Illu-
sions,” Psychological Review 103, no. 3 (1996), pp. 582-91.
59. Suzanne C. Thompson, “Illusions of Control: How We Overestimate
Our Personal Influence,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 8,
no. 6 (1999), pp. 187-90.
60. Francesca Gino, Don A. Moore, and Max H. Bazerman, No Harm, No
Foul: The Outcome Bias in Ethical Judgments (Harvard: Harvard Busi-
ness School, 2009).
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ent preferences; (ii) preference judgments are important
for holding a conception of the good; (iii) decision judg-
ments are required for the moral powers, so we can
rationally apply our goals and principles.
6.3 Empirical Findings
Capon and Kuhn (1980) compared adults with four age
groups (kindergarten, fourth grade, eighth grade and
college). Subjects rated a product along different dimen-
sions and said how important those different dimensions
were. Subjects of all ages were likely to possess and
express preferences along each individual dimension.
The researchers then asked them to rank the products.
Both adolescents and adults could integrate their prefer-
ences from two or more dimensions; younger children,
however, tended to make product judgments on the
basis of a single, constant dimension, ignoring other
dimensions over which they had expressed preferences.
Similarly, Bereby-Meyer et al. (2004) investigated the
choice strategies participants employed when applying
their preferences to choosing a product. 4- to 6-year-
olds base their choices mainly on the perceptual features
of a product. 8- to 9-year-olds could form more complex
preferences, but when applying them to choices, they
tended to use a lexicographic strategy, that is, only take
the single most important attribute into consideration in
their ranking. 9- to 13-year-olds could choose correctly
between two alternatives (each with three attributes) by
using the lexicographic and equal-weighting strategies
flexibly. Generally, 12- to 13-year-olds could make
preference judgments as well as adults.
There are a number of studies comparing adolescent
and adult decision-making directly.61 When making
decisions,
adolescents do not differ from adults in their compe-
tence, whether determined by their understanding of
alternatives, the rationality of their reasoning, or the
reasonableness of their choices.62
In studies testing decision-making fallacies, ‘older teens
did not perform substantially worse, if at all inferior, to
adults’.63 And, in general, the picture is of ‘modest
improvement’ through the teen years, with adults reach-
ing only a ‘very modest’ level of decision-making ration-
ality, with the average adult at least as likely (and often
much more likely) to make incorrect judgments as cor-
61. See Paul A. Klaczynski, “Analytic and Heuristic Processing Influences on
Adolescent Reasoning and Decision-Making,” Child Development 72,
no. 3 (2001a), pp. 844-61 and “Framing Effects on Adolescent Task
Representations, Analytic and Heuristic Processing, and Decision Mak-
ing: Implications for the Normative/Descriptive Gap,” Journal of
Applied Developmental Psychology 22, no. 3 (2001b), pp. 289-309.
62. Gary B. Melton, “Are Adolescents People? Problems of Liberty, Entitle-
ment, and Responsibility,” in The Adolescent as Decision-Maker: Appli-
cations to Development and Education, ed. Fred Danner and Judith
Worell (San Diego; London: Academic Press, 1989), p. 282. See also
Gerald P. Koocher, Gary B. Melton, and Michael J. Saks, Children’s
Competence to Consent (New York: Plenum, 1983).
63. Kuhn and Siegler, Handbook of Child Psychology. Volume 2, Cogni-
tion, Perception, and Language, p. 977.
rect ones in test scenarios.64 Indeed, one survey of the
material on competence of children suggested that the
majority of people at 14 had similar decision-making
capacities as adults.65 Therefore, since 12- to 16-year-
olds are about as likely to avoid decision-making errors
as adults, we cannot treat adolescents differently on the
basis of their decision-making rationality.
7 Argumentation
7.1 Definition
Broadly, argumentation skills are of two types, only one
of which is a component of autonomy. The first, which
we are interested in, is ‘argument construction’, which
covers the cognitive abilities of producing justifications
and counterarguments, and rebutting counterargu-
ments. The second is ‘argumentative discourse’ or ‘dis-
course strategies’, which is about engaging in a dialogue
in social contexts and about strategies to force conces-
sions from opponents or challenge their key premises.66
This second set of skills is not about constructing an
argument, but about competitive debating and negotia-
tion. While (as discussed later) mid and late adolescents
possess argument construction abilities which are simi-
lar to adults’, they lag behind in social discourse strat-
egies. Specifically, in social discursive (or debate) scen-
arios, mid-adolescents are not as good as adults at select-
ing strategies to challenge opponents or defend their
own position, at portraying the merits of opponents’
positions, or at coordinating multiple perspectives in an
argument.67
Why are discourse strategies less normatively relevant to
us here? For autonomy, as set out in Sections 2 and 3,
individuals must be able to produce arguments (under-
stood as chains of reasoning rather than performative
debates) to generate and critique their conceptions of
the good, conceptions of justice, and plans to pursue
them. This basic ability to form autonomous plans does
not require the debating skills, verbal dexterity and
argumentative strategy required for ‘argumentative/
social discourse’. While debating may help individuals
formulate their autonomous goals, it is not a core com-
ponent of autonomy itself. Sure, on epistocratic or com-
petence-based approaches to democracy, debating abili-
ties may help improve the quality of democratic dis-
course. Then again, since debating skills are often linked
to formal education, requiring that citizens be good
64. Ibid.
65. Schmidt and Reppucco, “Children’s Rights and Capacities,” p. 160.
66. See Mark K. Felton, “The Development of Discourse Strategies in Ado-
lescent Argumentation,” Cognitive Development 19, no. 1 (2004), pp.
35-37; Deanna Kuhn and Wadiya Udell, “The Development of Argu-
ment Skills,” Child Development 74, no. 5 (2003), p. 1245.
67. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing this point. See Felton, “The
Development of Discourse Strategies in Adolescent Argumentation,”
pp. 35-52; Deanna Kuhn and Wadiya Udell, “Coordinating Own and
Other Perspectives in Argument,” Thinking & Reasoning 13, no. 2
(2007), pp. 90-104; Kuhn and Udell, “The Development of Argument
Skills.”
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debaters to have the vote may reduce the diversity of
voices and hence the quality of democratic decision-
making. In any case, the autonomy approach is less con-
cerned with the quality of show debates and discussions.
As such, so long as the individual can construct their
own arguments to form a conception of the good, assess
how to achieve it, etc. they are autonomous in the cor-
rect way. Therefore, the abilities of ‘argumentative dis-
course’ are less relevant for the autonomy account laid
out here.
The psychological capacities that we are interested in
are the skills of ‘argument construction’. These skills
(which form the last phase of ‘scientific reasoning’ dis-
cussed previously) include generating and evaluating
reasoned argument.68 (i) Argument generation involves
(a) offering valid supporting arguments for one’s
opinions; and (b) envisioning and critiquing counterar-
guments to those opinions. (ii) Argument evaluation
involves assessing the strength or soundness of argu-
ments and counterarguments, and, importantly, being
able to do this regardless of whether you independently
disagree with the conclusion.
7.2 Normative Significance
There are two main ways argument construction is rele-
vant for the franchise.
First, as mentioned in the previous sub-section, skills of
argumentation are important for the ability to form rea-
soned views of the right and the good, and how to pur-
sue them, by forming arguments for those positions,
probing the weaknesses of those positions and consider-
ing alternative positions.
Second, argumentative ability is important for individu-
als to make decisions in scenarios where they rely on
expert advice. Means-ends judgments are required for
both moral powers. When we cannot make means-ends
judgments ourselves, we must rely on the judgments of
others. But to understand those judgments fully, and to
weigh the reasons given for and against various options,
we must be able to evaluate those expert judgments and
opposing arguments. Such abilities facilitate the
informed consent required to preserve autonomy. The
argument for the normative importance of argumenta-
tive abilities in this sphere runs as follows:
i. To be fully autonomous, we must understand (the
reasons for and against) the decisions we make (i.e.
our decisions must be based on informed consent).
ii. Many decisions require specialised knowledge to
understand the options, and this knowledge is (ordi-
narily) accessible only via expert advice.
iii. For that advice to help us understand certain
options, we must be able to understand and assess
the reasons for/against those options (i.e. have
argumentative capabilities).
Therefore:
68. Kuhn and Siegler, Handbook of Child Psychology. Volume 2, Cogni-
tion, Perception, and Language, p. 978. For discussion of different
frameworks, see Lehrer and Schauble, “The Development of Scientific
Thinking,” pp. 700-4.
iv. To be fully autonomous when making specialised
decisions, individuals require argumentative capa-
bilities.
Premise (i) is true since, to make an autonomous deci-
sion, ‘one’s choice must be real; [thus] one must have at
least a certain minimum education and information’.69 If
one lacks key information, then this acts as a hindrance
to meaningful choice.70 We do, for example, take
(unwilful, non-negligent) ignorance as a defence for
many crimes,71 and doctors are required to provide
patients with information to help the patient make a
decision.72 Premise (ii) is empirically true of many of the
decisions we make in the political sphere, which depend
on policy expertise or economic or scientific expertise
etc. I also take (iii) to be true. When giving advice,
experts usually provide us with certain options (even if
one option is ‘do nothing’) and give reasons for and
against each option; thus, giving advice involves provid-
ing reasons. Argumentative ability includes the ability to
follow and critique those reasons. Therefore, to under-
stand the advice of experts, we need argumentative abil-
ities. Note that the capabilities in (iii) do not require
strategic discourse, since when we read expert opinions
or take expert advice, we are rarely in an adversarial sce-
nario where we are trying to ‘win’ the argument. We
merely need cognitive abilities to follow and critique
those arguments. From (i) to (iii) it follows that, to be
fully autonomous when making specialised decisions,
individuals must be able to understand, follow and eval-
uate the advice (arguments) of others and hence require
some level of argumentative ability.
If an individual lacks argumentative capabilities, and
therefore cannot comprehend or assess the advice they
are being given, then we would doubt their ability to
make an informed decision. And if an individual is
unable to make informed decisions, then we are not
required, out of respect for autonomy, to respect their
decisions, whether personal or political. Note that the
concern here is not that individuals actually do possess
that knowledge, but rather that they possess the ability
(and opportunity) to gather that knowledge. On the flip
side, if they possess this capacity and they can make
autonomous and informed decisions, then we must
respect their decisions out of respect for their autono-
my.
7.3 Empirical Findings
As with the other stages of scientific reasoning described
earlier, age is not an effective proxy at measuring devel-
opment in persuasive and perspective-taking abilities;
there is wide variability in individual abilities.73 Argu-
69. Griffin, On Human Rights, p. 33.
70. Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical
Ethics, 7th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 120-21.
71. E.g. R v. G & R [2003] 3 WLR House of Lords.
72. Jonathan Herring, Medical Law and Ethics, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014), pp. 165-72.
73. Ruth Anne Clark and Jesse G. Delia, “The Development of Functional
Persuasive Skills in Childhood and Early Adolescence,” Child Develop-
ment 47, no. 4 (1976), p. 1013.
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mentation, as explained earlier, is composed of (i) argu-
ment generation, which includes generating supporting
arguments and considering counter-arguments; and (ii)
argument evaluation. Let’s take each in turn.
(1) Generation of supporting arguments. There is some
slight difference between younger teenagers and adults
here. ‘[O]n average about one-third of a teen sample’
could offer ‘a valid supporting argument for their
claim[s] … a percentage that increased only very mod-
estly to near one half among adults’.74 Therefore, there
is some small difference between adults and young ado-
lescents in generating supporting arguments. However,
this difference in ability is eliminated by later adoles-
cence and, anyway, chronological age between 12 and 60
is not a strong predictor of this skill.75
(2) Consideration of counterarguments. In some studies
on the topic, it was found that young adolescents con-
centrate their efforts on exposition of their own claims
to the neglect of attending to their opponent’s claims.
Kuhn and Udell (2007) found that when adults and ado-
lescents are asked to write arguments in favour of their
position, about half of adults will attend to rebutting
potential counterarguments, whereas a little under a
third of 12- to 14-year-olds will do the same.76 How-
ever, when their ability to consider counterarguments is
tested directly, they are at near ceiling performance,
meaning that an ‘inability to generate arguments against
an opposition position cannot be regarded as a major
contributor’ to their lower tendency to generate coun-
terarguments.77 They can ‘attend to the other’s argu-
ment … when explicitly instructed to do so’.78 There-
fore, it seems that the differences between young teens
and adults are explained by differences in argumentative
strategy rather than in argument construction. Thus,
adolescents do have the ability to consider counterargu-
ments, even if, as a matter of strategic judgment, they
often do not. Since we care about the possession of
capabilities (rather than the second-order inclination to
deploy them), it is possessing these first-order capabili-
ties that matters for their autonomy. And indeed, con-
trary to their earlier results, Kuhn and Siegler (2006)
find that young teens (12-14) and adults are equally like-
ly to address both sides of the argument in an argumen-
tative scenario.79 Taking (1) and (2) together, overall:
74. Kuhn and Siegler, Handbook of Child Psychology. Volume 2, Cogni-
tion, Perception, and Language, p. 979.
75. Ibid.
76. Kuhn and Udell, “Coordinating Own and Other Perspectives in Argu-
ment,” p. 100.
77. Ibid., pp. 100-1.
78. Deanna Kuhn et al., “Arguing on the Computer: A Microgenetic Study
of Developing Argument Skills in a Computer-Supported Environment,”
Child Development 79, no. 5 (2008), pp. 1310-28, 1311. Also Kuhn
and Udell, “Coordinating Own and Other Perspectives in Argument.”
79. Kuhn and Siegler, Handbook of Child Psychology. Volume 2, Cogni-
tion, Perception, and Language, p. 979. See also Deanna Kuhn, Victoria
Shaw, and Mark Felton, “Effects of Dyadic Interaction on Argumentive
Reasoning,” Cognition and Instruction 15, no. 3 (1997), pp. 287-315;
Mark Felton and Deanna Kuhn, “The Development of Argumentive
Discourse Skill,” Discourse Processes 32, no. 2-3 (2001), pp. 135-53.
the available research indicates only slight improve-
ment during the adolescent years [from age 12] in the
ability to produce sound arguments.80
(3) Argument evaluation. For this, psychologists meas-
ure the bias towards those arguments whose conclusions
you already agree with by measuring your tendency to
miss deliberately planted mistakes in those arguments.
Both adolescents and adults, ‘exhibited a positive bias
towards studies that portrayed their group favourably’,
and ‘the extent of this bias did not diminish with age’.
Indeed, ‘on one indicator it in fact increased’ with age!81
Thus, adolescents do not lag behind adults in their abili-
ty to evaluate arguments.82
There is no difference in the argument construction
abilities of adults and adolescents, and adolescents lag
behind adults only in argumentative strategy. It also
seems that many such skills can be improved through
education and training.83 Therefore, we cannot appeal
to argumentative construction abilities as a basis for
granting different rights to older adolescents (14-16)
and adults.
8 Moral Reasoning
In this section, I examine development in moral reason-
ing. Moral reasoning is important for the two moral
powers. The ability to reason in moral terms, and be
motivated by that reasoning, implies and constitutes the
first moral power, that is, the capacity to understand, to
apply and to act from moral principles and principles of
justice. Moral reasoning is also important for the second
moral power, since the ability to reason morally also
implies an ability to reason about the good. This can
supply the last few pieces of the second moral power
(the capacity for a conception of the good), namely, it
supplies the ability to ‘have’ a conception of the good
and a full ability to ‘revise’ it. The ability to have a con-
ception of the good requires the ability to understand
and internalise norms and principles about the good. An
ability to revise a conception of the good requires the
ability to reason in evaluative and normative terms, abil-
ities that correspond to moral reasoning.
I first examine development in prosocial moral reason-
ing and then complex moral reasoning (which involves
balancing social and personal goals with moral consider-
ations). In each case, the results show that adolescents
80. Kuhn and Siegler, Handbook of Child Psychology. Volume 2, Cogni-
tion, Perception, and Language, p. 979.
81. Ibid., p. 980.
82. See also Deanna Kuhn, “How Do People Know?,” Psychological Sci-
ence 12, no. 1 (2001), pp. 1-8, 5.
83. Kuhn, “What Is Scientific Thinking and How Does It Develop?,” p. 512;
Kuhn and Siegler, Handbook of Child Psychology. Volume 2, Cogni-
tion, Perception, and Language, pp. 981-82; Marion Goldstein, Aman-
da Crowell, and Deanna Kuhn, “What Constitutes Skilled Argumenta-
tion and How Does It Develop?,” Informal Logic 29, no. 4 (2010),
p. 379.
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can reason morally in nuanced and sophisticated ways,
and to the same level as adults.
8.1 Prosocial Reasoning
Prosocial moral reasoning is:
reasoning about moral dilemmas in which one per-
son’s needs or desires conflict with those of others in
a context in which the role of prohibitions, authori-
ties’ dictates, and formal obligations is minimal.84
Prosocial moral reasoning is not therefore looking at
obedience to law or deference to authority but purely at
interpersonal moral conflicts.85 Empirically, it seems
that from the age of 12 individuals reason using abstract
moral principles and can reason in nuanced ways about
distributive fairness, incorporating factors such as des-
ert, talent, advantage and disadvantage.86 These results
are confirmed in a large, long-running longitudinal
study into the development of prosocial moral reasoning
in individuals aged 6-20 run by Eisenberg et al.87 Inter-
estingly, hedonistic (i.e. self-interested), direct-reci-
procity (you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours) and
approval-oriented (concern with social approval and
acceptance) modes of moral reasoning, all of which
declined through adolescence, stopped declining, and
even increased slightly, in early adulthood. Overall, the
results show that individuals from early adolescence can
use the range of moral concepts and principles in their
prosocial moral reasoning that are available to adults.
And, indeed, the results suggest that adolescents are
more willing to use more of those other-regarding moral
concepts than individuals in early adulthood, when
people become more concerned with social perceptions
and social success relative to other moral concerns than
at younger ages.88
Indeed, even in tests of strong moral dilemmas that,
unlike the prosocial scenarios, involve legal obligations
and dictates of authority (e.g. can you steal medicine to
save your sick wife?), adolescents and adults are at the
same level of moral reasoning.89 Preadolescent children
often struggle in such scenarios and default to mere obe-
dience to authority or to self-interested reasoning about
the need to avoid punishment.90 Such reasoning is espe-
cially common in young children, although adults can
84. Nancy Eisenberg et al., “Prosocial Development in Late Adolescence: A
Longitudinal Study,” Child Development 66, no. 4 (1995), p. 1179.
85. Testing moral reasoning in hypothetical scenarios in which laws, author-
ity and definite rules apply can mask the moral reasoning abilities of
younger children. See Elliot Turiel, “The Development of Morality,” in
Handbook of Child Psychology. Volume 3, Social, Emotional, and Per-
sonality Development, ed. Nancy Eisenberg, 1 online resource (1 vol-
ume) (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2006), pp. 800, 824.
86. Ibid., pp. 824-25.
87. Eisenberg et al., “Prosocial Development in Late Adolescence: A Longi-
tudinal Study.”
88. Ibid.
89. Daniel K. Lapsley, Moral Psychology (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1996), pp. 64-65, 78; “Moral Stage Theory,” in Handbook of Moral
Development, ed. Judith G. Smetana and Melanie Killen (Mahwah, NJ:
Taylor and Francis, 2006), p. 49.
90. Lapsley, Moral Psychology, p. 68.
also exhibit this level of reasoning.91 The crucial devel-
opmental transition away from such reasoning (and
towards reasoning about relationships, virtues and soci-
etal level reasoning) generally occurs during the late ele-
mentary years and has occurred for most people, if not
nearly everyone, by 13.92 And this level of reasoning is
typical of both adults and adolescents.93 The point is
stated clearly by Melton, who, in his review, concludes
that:
the evidence is overwhelming that in fact most ado-
lescents do have the capability to act as citizens of the
moral community.94
8.2 Complex Reasoning
The previous sub-section described development in dif-
ferent modes of moral reasoning. Something else that
develops across childhood is the ability to deal with
more complex moral scenarios by coordinating the vari-
ous morally and socially salient aspects of those scen-
arios. Nucci and Turiel (2009) investigated development
in contextual moral decision-making and in how people
coordinated different elements of moral decisions. They
presented participants with three basic types of scen-
arios: direct harm (whether to hit another child); indi-
rect harm (whether to return money to a child who
unknowingly dropped it); and helping someone in need
(whether to seek help for a child who falls and is
injured). In each scenario, the researchers varied the
cost of the moral action (i.e. whether it conflicted with
the desires of the protagonist or was ‘unconflicted’) and
the characteristics of the other child (whether they were
simply a ‘girl’ or a ‘boy’, someone who had bullied the
protagonist previously, or a vulnerable child). The
study was conducted on 7- to 17-year-olds.95
All participants agreed that hitting another child unpro-
voked would be wrong. In scenarios where the other
child hits the protagonist first, about half of the children
at each age thought that the protagonist had the right to
self-defence, though the percentage of 10- to 14-year-
olds claiming this right was higher than for 8- and 16-
year-olds.
In the indirect harm scenario, someone unknowingly
drops some money, and the protagonist must decide
whether to return or keep the money. The participants
91. Anne Colby and Lawrence Kohlberg, The Measurement of Moral Judg-
ment / Vol.2, Standard Issue Scoring Manual (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987).
92. Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan, “The Adolescent as a Philoso-
pher: The Discovery of the Self in a Postconventional World,” Daedalus
100, no. 4 (1971), pp. 1051-86.
93. There are, however, some adults who never move beyond pre-conven-
tional reasoning. Moshman, Adolescent Psychological Development:
Rationality, Morality, and Identity, pp. 48-49; F. Clark Power, Ann Hig-
gins-D’Alessandro, and Lawrence Kohlberg, Lawrence Kohlberg’s
Approach to Moral Education (New York: Columbia University Press,
1989), pp. 29-30; Kohlberg and Gilligan, “The Adolescent as a Philoso-
pher: The Discovery of the Self in a Postconventional World.”
94. Melton, “Are Adolescents People? Problems of Liberty, Entitlement,
and Responsibility,” p. 282.
95. Larry Nucci and Elliot Turiel, “Capturing the Complexity of Moral
Development and Education,” Mind, Brain, and Education 3, no. 3
(2009), p. 153.
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were asked whether the protagonist had a ‘right’ to keep
the money or had an obligation to return it. The results
are shown in Figure 1. For 8-year-olds the situation
poses little ambiguity: to keep the money is the same as
stealing it from the passenger’s pocket. For the 14-year-
old, however, the situation is more complex. Typical
answers include:
he’s not necessarily doing something wrong [in keep-
ing the money], but the right thing to do would be to
give it back … [it’s] not in the kid’s house or
anything.
For the 14-year-old, the ambiguity of the situation sug-
gests that keeping or returning the money is a matter of
personal prerogative. This mode of reasoning is more
nuanced and sensitive to the facts of the situation than
the 8-year-old’s. By 16, most adolescents have resolved
the ambiguity, seeing the situation as entailing a certain
form of theft. They consider the indirectness of the
theft to make it different from the act of intentional
stealing, but they consider the protagonist’s knowledge
that the money originally belonged to someone else to
place moral constraints on them. When the moral sali-
ence of the situation was upped and the child dropping
the money was described as vulnerable or disabled,
nearly all the participants said the money should be
returned.
In the helping scenario, a child falls and is injured.
Nearly all participants thought it would be wrong not to
help. However, in scenarios where providing help con-
flicts with the protagonist’s goals, or where the injured
child had previously bullied the protagonist, 14-year-
olds were less than half as likely as 8- and 16-year-olds
to say the protagonist has an obligation to help. As with
the other scenarios, the age-related pattern disappeared
when the injured child was described as vulnerable. The
results from the indirect harm and helping scenarios are
represented in Figure 1.
This study shows that children and adolescents move
from an early childhood set of judgments about unpro-
voked harm to notions of fairness and just reciprocity.
Moreover, children become more able to incorporate
multiple facets of moral situations; this then leads to
periods of transition in which the expanded capacity to
consider various aspects of moral situations leads to
more variations in moral judgments. This is why we see
the U-shaped patterns in the substantive answers to
moral questions. Young children tend to focus on blunt
moral aspects of the acts and are less likely to incorpo-
rate situational and non-moral features of the acts. The
increased social and moral understandings of older chil-
dren create more of a grey area in their minds, and
hence a greater variability of answers. Older adolescents
outperform their younger counterparts: early adoles-
cents can spot and incorporate situational information;
older adolescents can coordinate that information in
ways that ‘afforded a moral resolution while acknowl-
edging competing nonmoral interests’.96 The results of
this study show that, while individuals (as discussed
earlier) from the age of 11 or 12 can reason using sophis-
ticated moral principles, it is from the age of 16 that
individuals can integrate and balance competing moral
principles in complex or ambiguous moral dilemmas.
Sections 4-8 together show that 16- to 17-year-olds have
reached the threshold level of psychological develop-
ment across all five of the core cognitive abilities needed
for the two moral powers. As such, 16- to 17-year-olds
possess the two moral powers and, with it, core autono-
my.
96. Ibid., p. 156.
Figure 1 Right to keep money and obligation to help by age (Nucci and Turiel, 2009, p. 154)
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9 Hierarchical Control and
Impulsivity
In this final section, I address the claim that adolescents
may be too impulsive to vote. One important element of
autonomous decision-making is ‘hierarchical control’,
understood here as the ability to think about and control
one’s thoughts and motivations, and to regulate and
control confounding internal factors, such as emotions,
which can interfere with those mental processes needed
for thought and action, and, in particular, the capacity
to regulate and control the mental processes needed for
the exercise of the two moral powers.97 While this is not
a component of core autonomy as set out in Section 2, it
is a second-order power needed to enable the operation
of those powers, and to ensure autonomous decision-
making. If you lack this power, then, while you possess
the ability to formulate rational goals and plans, emo-
tionality and impulses may interfere with that reasoning
and frustrate your ability to make properly autonomous
decisions.
Although adolescents have reached adult levels of cogni-
tive capacity latest by age 16, adolescents are not yet as
developed as adults in psychosocial maturity (this is the
psychological/behavioural expression of the neurologi-
cal differences alluded to in p. 3).98 ‘Psychosocial matur-
ity’ actually refers to a wide range of abilities and pro-
pensities, such as risk-seeking, sensation/pleasure-seek-
ing, future-discounting and compliance with peer
groups.99 A number of these are irrelevant to whether an
individual has autonomy. It can be, for example, consis-
tent with autonomous choice to be thrill-seeking (one
can autonomously save money and plan for bungee-
jumping or skiing trips). Similarly, one can autono-
mously take greater risks, prioritise current over future
benefits or prioritise social inclusion over individuality.
However, impulse control is relevant to the capacity to
make one’s higher-order preferences and values effec-
tive in one’s actions. To the extent someone lacks con-
trol over their impulses, they lack that hierarchical
capacity to pursue self-chosen goals and values. More
precisely, impulsivity ‘refers to a lack of self-control or
97. On hierarchical accounts of autonomy, see Harry G. Frankfurt, “Free-
dom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” in The Inner Citadel:
Essays on Individual Autonomy, ed. John Philip Christman (New York;
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. x, 267 pages, 73; Gerald
Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1988), p. 20.
98. G. Icenogle et al., “Adolescents’ Cognitive Capacity Reaches Adult Lev-
els Prior to Their Psychosocial Maturity: Evidence for a ‘Maturity Gap’ in
a Multinational, Cross-Sectional Sample,” Law and Human Behaviour
43, no. 1 (2019), pp. 69-85; Laurence Steinberg et al., “Are Adoles-
cents Less Mature Than Adults?: Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juve-
nile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA ‘Flip-Flop’,” The American
Psychologist 64, no. 7 (2009), pp. 583-94.
99. Steinberg et al., “Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?: Minors’
Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA
‘Flip-Flop’,” pp. 587-88.
deficiencies in response inhibition’,100 and ‘the extent to
which one acts without thinking [and] has difficulty
controlling impulses’.101 Impulsivity leads to hasty,
unplanned behaviour, which is not reflective of one’s
autonomy.
In one of the key studies on impulsivity, Steinberg et al.
(2008) find that impulsivity declines steadily and linear-
ly from age 10 to 30.102 The development of impulse
control seems to happen mainly in late adolescence and
early adulthood. The 16- to 17-year-olds and the 18- to
21-year-olds in the study were significantly less impul-
sive than younger ages, but significantly more than the
22- to 25-year-olds or the 26- to 30-year-olds. These
results are also found in other studies using different
scales of impulsivity or measuring psychosocial maturity
more broadly.103 This suggests that while adolescents
can make mature decisions in scenarios where cognitive
capacity predominates, they may struggle in emotionally
intense situations.104 This could suggest that while ado-
lescents should be treated as adults ‘for decisions typi-
cally made with deliberation’, this may not be appropri-
ate for decisions ‘typically made in emotionally charged
situations’.105
Do these findings mean that teenagers should be denied
the vote? Probably not. First, there is a case that
although late adolescents have lower hierarchical control
than older adults, they may not fall below the critical
threshold needed for full autonomy. There is little dif-
ference between those 16- to 17-year-olds and 18- to 21-
year-olds in Steinberg et al.’s study. And indeed, 25%
of 14- to 15-year-olds have a level of psychosocial
maturity above the mean for 26- to 30-year-olds.106 But
second, and more important, voting is not the kind of
‘hot’, or emotionally charged decision where lower hier-
archical control matters, meaning that their lower hier-
archical control does not disqualify them from this
100. Laurence Steinberg et al., “Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and
Impulsivity as Indexed by Behavior and Self-Report: Evidence for a Dual
Systems Model,” Developmental Psychology 44, no. 6 (2008), p. 1765.
101. Steinberg et al., “Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults? Minors’
Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA
‘Flip-Flop’,” p. 588.
102. Steinberg et al., “Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity
as Indexed by Behavior and Self-Report: Evidence for a Dual Systems
Model,” pp. 1771, 1774. See also L. Steinberg et al., “Around the
World, Adolescence Is a Time of Heightened Sensation Seeking and
Immature Self-Regulation,” Developmental Science 21, no. 2 (2018),
103. See Adriana Galvan et al., “Risk-Taking and the Adolescent Brain: Who
Is at Risk?,” Developmental Science 10, no. 2 (2007), pp. F8-F14 on 7-
to 29-year-olds, and Rotem Leshem and Joseph Glicksohn, “The Con-
struct of Impulsivity Revisited,” Personality and Individual Differences
43, no. 4 (2007), pp. 681-91 on 14- to 22-year-olds. Also Steinberg et
al., “Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults? Minors’ Access to
Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA ‘Flip-Flop’”;
Laurence Steinberg and Elizabeth Cauffman, “Maturity of Judgment in
Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making,” Law
and Human Behavior 20, no. 3 (1996), pp. 249-72.
104. Icenogle et al., “Adolescents’ Cognitive Capacity Reaches Adult Levels
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right. Voting does not lend itself to the kinds of intense
emotionality that some adolescents struggle with. Ado-
lescents suffer from cognitive slippage in decision-mak-
ing in scenarios such as acute hospitalisation, intoxica-
tion or under the stress of police questioning.107 But
voting is unlike those scenarios. In fact, voting is consid-
ered a typical case of ‘cold cognition’, where the final
decision is made in the absence of high emotion.108
After all, political decisions are taken after weeks, if not
months, of political campaigning to give space to slow
deliberation. The final decision itself is normally made
in the sober atmosphere of a polling booth. Even if a
decision is made ‘on the spur of the moment’, that does
not mean that emotionality or impulse inhibited the
exercise of reason.109 Indeed, existing work on political
decision-making among teenagers suggests that impul-
sivity does not affect their decision-making:
To date, there is no neurological evidence that indi-
cates that 16- and 17-year-olds lack the requisite neu-
rological maturation necessary for citizenship or for
responsible voting.110
And in countries where 16- to 17-year-olds have been
allowed to vote, the quality of their choices became sim-
ilar to that of older voters, and there is
no convincing evidence that the voting decisions of
voters under 18 are in any way of lesser quality …
than that of older groups of voters.111
Quality of voter choice is here the level of ideological
congruence between the voters and the party they vote
for. This suggests that emotionality and impulsivity is
not interfering with the connection between 16- and 17-
year-olds’ political views and their decisions any more
than it does for adults.
Therefore, although adolescents possess the full cogni-
tive powers that constitute the two moral powers,
impulsivity could indicate an autonomy-based reason
for adolescents (especially younger adolescents) to have
different rights or have their rights respected differently
107. On hospitalisation scenarios, see P. Harris and M.S. Lipian, “Under-
standing Emotion and Experiencing Emotion,” in Children’s Under-
standing of Emotion, ed. Paul L. Harris and Carolyn Saarni (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), quoted in Carolyn Saarni et al.,
“Emotional Development: Action, Communication, and Understand-
ing,” in Handbook of Child Psychology. Volume 3, Social, Emotional,
and Personality Development, ed. Nancy Eisenberg (Hoboken, NJ: John
Wiley, 2006), p. 277. Also Steinberg, “Adolescent Brain Science and
Juvenile Justice Policymaking,” p. 411.
108. Icenogle et al., “Adolescents’ Cognitive Capacity Reaches Adult Levels
Prior to Their Psychosocial Maturity: Evidence for a ‘Maturity Gap’ in a
Multinational, Cross-Sectional Sample,” p. 71.
109. It is important to distinguish impulsivity and spontaneity. A spontaneous
action involves quick decisions made in light of higher-order goals.
Impulsiveness, on the other hand, is characterised more by the absence
of decision. The distinguishing feature of an impulse is that one has
reduced control over whether to follow that impulse.
110. Hart and Atkins, “American Sixteen-and Seventeen-Year-Olds Are
Ready to Vote,” p. 220.
111. Wagner, Johann, and Kritzinger, “Voting at 16: Turnout and the Quali-
ty of Vote Choice,” p. 380.
from adults. But considering that (i) adolescents may
not fall below the critical threshold of hierarchical con-
trol in general, (ii) voting does not usually involve the
kind of emotionality that some teenagers struggle with,
and (iii) the evidence suggests adolescent impulsivity is
not a barrier to their political decision-making, it seems
unlikely to indicate a reason that they should not vote.
10 Conclusion
This article has examined the normative grounds for the
right to vote, and then seen empirically whether 16- and
17-year-olds meet the criteria to qualify for the fran-
chise. I have advanced the view that respect for autono-
my grounds the right to vote. Taking the Rawlsian two
moral powers as the exemplar for autonomy, I laid out
the psychological capacities that correspond to the two
moral powers. Finally, I summarised findings from
empirical psychology that suggest that 16- and 17-year-
olds, and some younger adolescents, possess those two
moral powers. From the evidence laid out above, it
seems generally that there is little discernible difference
in cognitive ability between (older) adolescents and
adults. Examining their cognitive abilities as aggregate
groups, it can be difficult to distinguish adolescents
from adults.112 Indeed,
cognitive differences among adolescents and adults
are not related strongly to age … [most adults] never
proceed beyond the level of an average adolescent –
and many adolescents function more rationally than
an average adult.113
Therefore, 16- and 17-year-olds have a pro tanto right
to vote. And while adolescents may have less hierarchi-
cal control than older adults, this does not disqualify
from the franchise, first, because it is not clear they fall
below a critical threshold and, second, because voting is
not the kind of ‘hot’ decision where emotionality is a
problem for the operation of core autonomy. However,
the argument here has not definitely shown that the
voting age should be lowered: it has not established the
autonomy account, and if one rejected those accounts,
then this argument to lower the franchise will not be
convincing. Moreover, the argument here only provides
a pro tanto moral right to vote for 16- and 17-year-olds.
If there were, for example, significantly negative conse-
quences to letting them vote, that might defeat this right
(although the evidence from places they can vote do not
suggest such negative consequences).114
So, since adolescents aged 16 and 17 (and quite proba-
bly those a little younger) possess the natural features
required for autonomy, then, to the extent that respect
for autonomy requires granting political rights including
112. Moshman, Adolescent Psychological Development: Rationality, Mor-
ality, and Identity, p. 6.
113. Ibid., p. 40
114. Peto, “Why the Voting Age Should Be Lowered to 16.”
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the right to vote – and barring some special circum-
stances that apply only to them – 16- and 17-year-olds
should be granted the right to vote.
What do the findings here imply for other rights? Gen-
erally, the findings suggest that for ‘cool’ decisions,
which are not typically made in situations of intense
emotionality, adolescents possess the same moral rights
as adults. What that should mean for legal rights will
depend on the right in question, and on a range of prac-
tical factors. For ‘hot’ decisions, the argument here still
leaves open what the correct response is. Are adoles-
cents above the critical threshold required for full adult
rights? If not, do we deny them decisions in such scen-
arios or merely facilitate their decision-making? Such
questions are left for further avenues of research.
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